Corpus Christi Ethics Commission

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Location: Corpus Christi, Texas, United States

I am here for a reason and not to be a Politician!

Monday, April 14, 2008

International Ethics Festival should address why CCISD does not inform parents of their rights and their children's rights????????????

Practice Areas

TEXAS JUVENILE LAW

In Texas, juveniles are defined as minors, older than 10 years of age and under the age of 17. Juveniles are treated differently than adult offenders and the general goal of the juvenile system is rehabilitation as opposed to punishment. However, the penalties in the juvenile system can still be severe. Some offenses, such as truancy and breaking curfew, are unique to juveniles, and would not be illegal if the accused were an adult. The juvenile justice system generally moves much more quickly than does the adult criminal justice system. Don't wait to hire a good juvenile defense lawyer to represent your child. Call Attorney David Finn at: 214-651-1121.

There are separate courts and rules that govern the juvenile process. The juvenile court system will generally make every effort to rehabilitate the child rather than simply incarcerate him. Only in extreme cases, such as serious felonies, usually involving allegations of violence or the use of a deadly weapon, will a juvenile be tried as an adult. The juvenile courts may hold a hearing to determine whether to transfer the juvenile to the adult court system. This is called a "transfer hearing." The court will base its decision to transfer on the following factors:

1. The seriousness of the offense
2. The child's criminal sophistication
3. Previous criminal record
4. Previous attempts to rehabilitate the juvenile offender
5. The court's belief that future attempts at rehabilitation will be unsuccessful

While many of the laws governing juveniles may differ from the adult system, the rights that juveniles enjoy are virtually identical to those enjoyed by adults.

1. A juvenile must be read his Miranda rights if placed under arrest.
2. A juvenile has the right to have an attorney present during interrogation.
3. A juvenile has the right to know the specific charges being brought by the State.
4. A juvenile has rights against self-incrimination.
5. A juvenile has the right to confront his accuser and examine witnesses.
6. A juvenile has the right to appeal the court's decision.
7. A juvenile does have the right to a jury trial during the adjudication phase

If a juvenile finds herself in a situation involving the police or other law enforcement, please remember the following information:

1. You do not have to submit to a search unless you have been placed under arrest.

If you are asked to give permission to search you should politely but firmly decline. If the police say they have a search warrant, ask to see it.

2. Do not resist arrest.
3. Do not volunteer information or answer questions without your attorney present.
4. Provide only your name, address, and phone number.
5. Call your parents as soon as possible.
6. Insist that your parents and an attorney be present during questioning.
7. Do not discuss your case with anyone other than your attorney.

Do not discuss your case with your friends or classmates.

Finally, do not attempt to represent yourself in court. Hire an experienced criminal defense attorney, preferably one who is board-certified in criminal law.

Texas Juvenile Justice: Overview

Taking Into Custody; Issuance of Warning Notice: Texas Family Code Section 52.01

A child may be taken into custody: pursuant to an order of the juvenile court; pursuant to the Texas laws for arrest; by a law enforcement officer if there is probable cause to believe that the child has engaged in conduct that violates the penal laws of Texas or any political subdivision or delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision. It is the duty of the law enforcement officer who has taken a child into custody to transport the child to the appropriate detention facility if the child is not released to the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child. If the juvenile detention facility is located outside the county in which the child is taken into custody, it shall be the duty of the law enforcement officer who has taken the child into custody or, if authorized by the commissioners court of the county, the sheriff of that county, to transport the child to the appropriate juvenile detention facility unless the child is released to the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child.

Delinquent Conduct: Conduct Indicating a Need for Supervision:

Texas Family Code Section 51.03

(a) Delinquent conduct is defined as:

1. conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates a penal law of Texas or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail;
2. conduct that violates a lawful order of a municipal court or justice court under circumstances that would constitute contempt of that court;
3. conduct that constitutes: Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), Flying While Intoxicated, Boating While Intoxicated, Intoxication Assault, Intoxication Manslaughter, and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol by a minor (DUI).

(b) Conduct indicating a need for supervision includes:

1. conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates the penal laws of Texas of the grade of misdemeanor that are punishable by a fine only (class c-misdemeanors); the penal ordinances of any political subdivision of Texas; the absence of a child on 10 or more days or parts of days within a 6 month period in the same school year or on 3 or more days or parts of days within a 4 week period from school; the voluntary absence of a child from the child's home without the consent of the child's parents or guardian for a substantial length of time or without intent to return; conduct prohibited by city ordinance or by state law involving the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of paint; or an act that violates a school district's previously communicated written standards of student conduct for which the child has been expelled under Section 37.007(c), Texas Education Code.

Release from Detention: Texas Family Code Section 53.02

(a) If a child is brought before the court or delivered to a detention facility, the intake or other authorized officer of the court shall immediately make an investigation and shall release the child unless it appears that his detention is warranted under subsection (b), below.

The release may be conditioned upon requirements reasonably necessary to insure the child's appearance at later proceedings, but the conditions of the release must be in writing and filed with the office or official designated by the court and a copy furnished to the child.

(b) A child taken into custody may be detained prior to hearing on the petition only if:

1. the child is likely to abscond or be removed from the court's jurisdiction;
2. suitable supervision, care, or protection for the child is not being provided by a parent, guardian, custodian, or other person;
3. the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person able to return the child to the court when required;
4. the child may be dangerous to himself or herself or the child may threaten the safety of the public if released;
5. the child has previously been found to be a delinquent child or has previously been convicted of a penal offense punishable by a term in jail or prison and is likely to commit an offense if released; or
6. the child's detention is required under subsection (f), below.

(c) If the child is not released, a request for detention hearing shall be made and promptly presented to the court, and an informal detention hearing shall be held promptly, but not later than the second working day after the child is taken into custody. If the child is taken into custody on a Friday or Saturday, then the detention hearing shall be held on the first working day after the child is taken into custody.

(d) A release of a child to an adult must be conditioned on the agreement of the adult to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to an order of contempt by the court if the adult, after notification, is unable to produce the child at later proceedings.

(e) If a child being released under this section is expelled from school in a county with a population greater than 125,000, the release shall be conditioned on the child's attending a juvenile justice alternative education program pending a deferred prosecution or formal court disposition of the child's case.

(f) A child who is alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct and to have used, possessed, or exhibited a firearm in the commission of the offense shall be detained until the child is released at the direction of the judge of the juvenile court, a substitute judge, or a referee appointed, including an oral direction by telephone, or until a detention hearing is held.

Detention Hearing: Texas Family Code Section 54.01

(a) Generally speaking, a detention hearing without a jury shall be held promptly, but not later than the second working day after the child is taken into custody; provided, however, that when a child is detained on a Friday or Saturday, then such detention hearing shall be held on the first working day after the child is taken into custody.

(b) Reasonable notice of the detention hearing, either oral or written, shall be given, stating the time, place, and purpose of the hearing. Notice shall be given to the child and, if they can be found, to his parents, guardian, or custodian. Prior to the beginning of the hearing, the court shall inform the parties of the child's right to counsel and to appointed counsel if they are indigent and of the child's right to remain silent with respect to any allegations of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision.

(c) At the detention hearing, the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or by professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. Prior to the detention hearing, the court shall provide the attorney for the child with access to all written matter to be considered by the court in making the detention decision. The court may order counsel not to reveal items to the child or his parents if such disclosure would materially harm the treatment and rehabilitation of the child or would substantially decrease the likelihood of receiving information from the same or similar sources in the future.

(d) A detention hearing may be held without the presence of the child's parents if the court has been unable to locate them. If no parent or guardian is present, the court shall appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem for the child.

(e) At the conclusion of the hearing the court shall order the child released from detention unless it appears that he is likely to abscond, suitable supervision is not being provided to the child, he has no parent or guardian able to return the child to court when required, he may be dangerous to himself or others, or he has previously been found to be a delinquent child or has been previously convicted of a penal offense higher than a Class C misdemeanor and is likely to commit an offense if released. If the judge concludes that the child should be detained, the detention order extends for no more than 10 working days. Further detention orders may be made following subsequent detention hearings. The initial detention hearing may not be waived, but subsequent detention hearing may be waived.

Note: No statement made by the child at the detention hearing shall be admissible against the child at any other hearing.

Preliminary Investigation & Determinations; Notice to Parents:

Texas Family Code Section 53.01

On referral of a child, the intake officer, probation officer, or other person authorized by the court shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether the person referred is a child and whether there is probable cause to believe that the child engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision. If it is determined that the person is not a child or there is no probable cause, the person shall immediately be released. The child's parents are to promptly receive notice of the whereabouts of the child and also a statement explaining why the child was taken into custody. If the child is alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct of the grade of felony, or conduct constituting a misdemeanor offense involving violence to a person or the use or possession of a firearm, illegal knife, or club, then the case is immediately forwarded to the office of the prosecuting attorney.

Summons: Texas Family Code Section 53.06

The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to the child named in the petition, the child's parents, guardian, or custodian, the child's guardian ad litem, and any other person who appears to the court to be a proper or necessary party to the proceeding. A party, other than the child, may waive service of summons by written stipulation or by voluntary appearance at the hearing.

Service of Summons: Texas Family Code Section 53.07

If a person to be served with a summons is in Texas and can be found, the summons shall be served upon him personally at least 2 days before the adjudication hearing. If he is in Texas but cannot be found, but his address is known or can be ascertained, the summons may be served on him by mailing a copy by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 5 days before the day of the hearing. If he is outside Texas but can be found or his address is known, service of the summons may be made either by delivering a copy to him personally or mailing a copy to him by registered mail, return receipt requested, at least 5 days before the day of the adjudication hearing.

Attendance at Hearing: Parent or Other Guardian: Texas Family Code Section 51.115

Parents or guardians of a child are required by law to attend each court hearing affecting a child held under: possible transfer to criminal district/adult court; adjudication hearing; disposition hearing; hearing to modify disposition; release or transfer hearing. If a parent or guardian receives notice of any of these proceedings and is a resident of Texas, failure to appear could result in a fine for contempt of court.

Photographs & Fingerprints of Children: Texas Family Code Sections 58.002-0021

With limited exceptions, a child may not be photographed or fingerprinted without the consent of the juvenile court unless the child is taken into custody or referred to the juvenile court for conduct that constitutes a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in jail (which means a Class A or Class B misdemeanor). However, this prohibition does not prohibit law enforcement from photographing or fingerprinting a child who is not in custody if the child's parent or guardian voluntarily consents in writing. Furthermore, this prohibition does not apply to fingerprints that are required or authorized to be submitted or obtained for an application for a driver's license or personal identification card.

Note/Exception to General Rule stated above: Law enforcement may take temporary custody of a child to take the child's fingerprints if the officer: has probable cause to believe that the child has engaged in delinquent conduct; the officer has investigated that conduct and found other fingerprints during the investigation; and the officer has probable cause to believe that the child's fingerprints will match the other fingerprints. Law enforcement may take temporary custody of a child to take the child's photograph if the officer: has probable cause to believe that the child has engaged in delinquent conduct; and the officer has probable cause to believe that the child's photograph will be of material assistance in the investigation of the conduct. However, in either instance, unless the child then placed under arrest, the child must be released from temporary custody as soon as the fingerprints or photographs are obtained.

Waiver of Rights: Texas Family Code Section 51.09

Unless a contrary intent clearly appears elsewhere in the Family Code, any right granted to a child by this Section or by the constitution or laws of Texas or the United States may be waived in proceedings under this section if:

1. the waiver is made by the child and the attorney for the child;
2. the child and the attorney waiving the right are informed of and understand the right and the possible consequences of waiving it;
3. the waiver is voluntary; and
4. the waiver is made in writing or in court proceedings that are recorded.

Polygraph Examination: Texas Family Code Section 51.151

If a child is taken into custody pursuant to an order of the juvenile court or pursuant to the laws of arrest by a law enforcement officer, a person may not administer a polygraph examination to the child without the consent of the child's attorney or the juvenile court unless the child is transferred to a criminal district court for prosecution in the adult system. Bottom line: Do not consent to a polygraph examination without consulting with your lawyer.

Physical or Mental Examination: Texas Family Code Section 51.20

(a) At any stage of the proceedings the juvenile court may order a child who is referred to the juvenile court or who is alleged by a petition or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision to be examined by the local mental health or mental retardation authority or another appropriate expert, including a physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist.

(b) If, after conducting an examination of a child and reviewing any other relevant information, there is reason to believe that the child has a mental illness or mental retardation, the probation department shall refer the child to the local mental health or mental retardation authority for evaluation and services, unless the prosecutor has filed a court petition against the child alleging delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision.

Election Between Juvenile Court & Alternate Juvenile Court:

Texas Family Code Section 51.18

(a) This section applies only to a child who has a right to a trial before a juvenile court the judge of which is not an attorney licensed to practice in Texas.

(b) On any matter that may lead to an order appealable under Section 56.01 of the Family Code, a child may be tried before either the juvenile court or the alternate juvenile court.

(c) The child may elect to be tried before the alternate juvenile court only if the child files a written notice with that court not later than 10 days before the date of the trial. After the notice is filed, the child may be tried only in the alternate juvenile court. If the child does not file a notice as provided by this section, the child may be tried only in the juvenile court.

(d) If the child is tried before the juvenile court, the child is not entitled to a trial de novo before the alternate juvenile court.

Transfer/Waiver: Texas Family Code Section 54.02

The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate criminal district court to be tried as an adult if the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony if the child was 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a capital felony, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree; or 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the second or third degree or a state jail felony.

The juvenile court judge is not required to certify a child to stand trial as an adult. It's a judgment call. The juvenile court judge will investigate the matter and hold a hearing on the transfer request. The judge orders a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and a full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense. At the transfer hearing the court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. In making her decision whether to transfer the case to the adult court, the judge considers: (1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against a person; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child; (3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use or procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.

Determinate Sentencing: Texas Family Code Section 53.045

If a child is accused of a very serious criminal violation, or habitual felony conduct (see section below), the prosecutor can pursue what is called determinate sentencing. In order to pursue determinate sentencing the prosecutor files a petition with the grand jury, basically asking the grand jury to grant the prosecutor's request to pursue determinate sentencing if the child is convicted. If 9 members of the grand jury approve the petition, then determinate sentencing becomes a viable sentencing option for the judge/jury if the child is convicted of the offense. Determinate sentencing doesn't mean that the child will be tried as an adult in a criminal district court. The case remains in the juvenile court even if the grand jury grants the request for determinate sentencing. but the stakes for the child are raised dramatically if the grand jury grants the prosecutor's petition for determinate sentencing.

Eligibility: The prosecutor can pursue determinate sentencing if the child is charged with habitual felony conduct, or if the child is charged with any of the following offenses:

capital murder, murder, manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, injury to a child, elderly, or disabled individual if punishable as a felony other than a state jail felony, felony deadly conduct involving the discharge of a firearm, aggravated controlled substance felony, criminal solicitation of a minor, indecency with a child, arson, if bodily injury or death is suffered by any person by reason of the commission of the arson, intoxication manslaughter, or attempted murder or attempted capital murder. If your child is charged with one of the offenses listed above, she is eligible for determinate sentencing even if this is her first offense.

Impact: If the grand jury grants the prosecutor's request to impose determinate sentencing, and the child is convicted of habitual felony conduct or any of the offenses listed above, then the court or jury may sentence the child to commitment in the Texas Youth Commission with a possible transfer to the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (adult prison system) for a term of: up to 40 years if the conduct constitutes a capital felony, first-degree felony, or an aggravated controlled substance felony; up to 20 years if the conduct constitutes a second-degree felony; and up to 10 years if the conduct constitutes a third-degree felony. So instead of being sent to the Texas Youth Commission until the child turns 18, determinate sentencing would allow the child to be sentenced to up to 40 years in the adult prison system by a judge or jury.

Habitual Felony Conduct: Texas Family Code Section 51.031

(a) Habitual felony conduct is conduct violating a penal law of the grade of felony, other than a state jail felony, if:

1. the child who engaged in the conduct has at least 2 previous final adjudications as having engaged in delinquent conduct violating a penal law of the grade of felony; and,
2. the second previous final adjudication is for conduct that occurred after the date the first previous adjudication became final; and,
3. all appeals relating to the previous adjudications have been exhausted.

Review by Prosecutor: Texas Family Code Section 53.012

The prosecuting attorney shall promptly review the circumstances and allegations of a referral made to her for legal sufficiency and the desirability of prosecution and may file a petition without regard to whether probable cause was found during the court's preliminary investigation.

If the prosecutor does not file a petition requesting the adjudication of the child referred to the prosecutor, the prosecutor must terminate all proceedings, if the reason is for the lack of probable cause; or return the referral to the juvenile probation department for further proceedings.

The prosecutors have considerable discretion and control over your child's case.

Deferred Prosecution: Texas Family Code Section 53.03

(a) Subject to subsections (e) and (g) below, if the preliminary investigation results in a determination that further proceedings in the case are authorized, the probation officer or other designated officer of the court, subject to the direction of the juvenile court, may advise the parties for a reasonable period of time not to exceed 6 months concerning deferred prosecution and rehabilitation of a child if:

1. deferred prosecution would be in the best interest of the public and child;
2. the child and her parent, guardian, or custodian consent with knowledge that consent is not obligatory; and
3. the child and his parent, guardian, or custodian are informed that they may terminate the deferred prosecution at any point and petition the court for a court hearing in the case.

(b) Except as otherwise permitted, the child may not be detained during or as a result of the deferred prosecution process.

(c) An incriminating statement made by a participant to the person giving advice and in the discussion or conferences incident thereto may not be used against the declarant in any court hearing.

(d) The court may adopt a fee schedule for deferred prosecution services. The maximum fee is $15 per month.

(e) The prosecuting attorney may defer prosecution for any child. A probation officer or other designated officer of the court may defer prosecution for a child who has previously been adjudicated for conduct that constitutes a felony only if the prosecuting attorney consents in writing.

(f) The probation officer or other officer supervising a program of deferred prosecution for a child shall report to the juvenile court any violation by the child of the program.

(g) Prosecution may not be deferred for a child alleged to have engaged in conduct that constitutes: driving/flying/boating while intoxicated, intoxication assault, intoxication manslaughter, or that constitutes a third or subsequent offense of consumption of alcohol by a minor or driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) of a minor.

First Offender Program: Texas Family Code Section 52.031

A juvenile board may establish a first offender program for the referral and disposition of children taken into custody for: (1) conduct indicating a need for supervision; or (2) delinquent conduct other than conduct that constitutes a felony of the first, second, or third degree, an aggravated controlled substance felony, or a capital felony; or a state jail felony or misdemeanor involving violence to a person or the use or possession of a firearm, illegal knife, or club, or a prohibited weapon, as described by Section 46.05, Texas Penal Code. If the child has previously been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct he may be ineligible for the First Offender Program. Also, the child's parents or guardian must receive notice that the child has been referred for disposition under the First Offender Program.

Teen Court Program: Texas Family Code Section 54.032

A juvenile court may defer adjudication proceedings during an adjudication hearing for not more than 180 days if the child:

(1) is alleged to have engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision that violated a penal law of Texas of the grade of misdemeanor that is punishable by a fine only or a penal ordinance of a political subdivision of Texas;

(2) waives the privilege against self-incrimination and testifies under oath that the allegations are true;

(3) presents to the court an oral or written request to attend a teen court program; and

(4) has not successfully completed a teen court program for the violation of the same penal law or ordinance in the two years preceding the date that the alleged conduct occurred.

Note: The teen court program must be approved by the court.

Adjudication Hearing: Texas Family Code Section 54.03

This is what is commonly referred to as the "guilty-not guilty" phase of a trial. A child may be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision only after an adjudication hearing. The child is presumed innocent unless and until the prosecution proves that the child is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the state. The verdict must be unanimous.

At the beginning of an adjudication hearing the juvenile court judge shall explain to the child and his parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem: the allegations made against the child; the nature and possible consequences of the proceedings; the child's privilege against self-incrimination; the child's right to trial and to confront witnesses; the child's right to representation by an attorney if he is not already represented; and the child's right to a trial by jury.

Only material, relevant, and competent evidence in accordance with the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence may be considered in an adjudication hearing. Hearsay testimony is generally not admissible. A statement made by the child out of court is insufficient to support a finding of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision unless it is corroborated in whole or in part by other evidence. An adjudication of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision cannot be had upon testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the child with the alleged delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the alleged conduct. Finally, evidence illegally seized or obtained is inadmissible in an adjudication hearing.

A child may be found guilty of committing a lesser-included offense of the offense charged.

If the judge or jury finds that the child did engage in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision, then the court or jury shall state which of the allegations in the petition were found to be established by the evidence. The court will then set a date and time for the disposition hearing.

If the judge or jury finds that the child did not engage in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision, the court shall dismiss the case with prejudice.

Disposition Hearing: Texas Family Code Section 54.04

This term can be confusing. What we're talking about here is the "sentencing" phase of the proceedings. The disposition hearing only comes into play if the child has been found guilty of the delinquent conduct or criminal activity alleged in the petition. If the child is found not guilty of all allegations during the adjudication hearing then there is no disposition hearing.

The disposition hearing is separate, distinct, and subsequent to the adjudication hearing. There is no right to a jury at the disposition hearing unless the child is in jeopardy of a determinate sentence as approved by the grand jury. If the child is eligible for determinate sentencing, then the child is entitled to a jury of 12 persons to determine the sentence.

At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court may consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses. Prior to the disposition hearing, the child's lawyer is to have received all written matter to be considered in disposition. No disposition may be made unless the child is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made. No disposition placing the child on probation outside the child's home may be made under this section unless the court or jury finds that the child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation. If the judge or jury grant probation, the court will attach various conditions of the probation. Depending on the nature of the charges and the child's criminal history, if probation is not granted, the child could be sentenced to a term of confinement in the Texas Youth Commission.

Payment of Probation Fees: Texas Family Code Section 54.061

If a child is placed on probation, the juvenile court, after giving the child, parent, or other person responsible for the child's support, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, shall order the child, parent, or other person, if financially able to do so, to pay to the court a fee of not more than $15 a month during the period that the child continues on probation. If the court finds that a child, parent, or other person responsible for the child's support is financially unable to pay the probation fee, the court shall enter into the records of the child's case a statement of that finding.

Monitoring School Attendance: Texas Family Code Section 54.043

If the court places a child on probation and requires as a condition of probation that the child attend school, the probation officer shall monitor the child's school attendance and report to the court if the child is voluntarily absent from school.

Restitution: Texas Family Code Section 54.048

A juvenile court, in a disposition hearing, may order restitution to be made by the child and the child's parents. This applies regardless of whether the petition in the case contains a plea for restitution.

Admission of Unadjudicated Conduct: Section 54.045

During a disposition hearing, a child may admit having engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision for which the child has not been adjudicated and request the court to take the admitted conduct into account in the disposition of the child's pending case. If the prosecutor agrees in writing, then the court may take the admitted conduct into account in the disposition of the child. However, a court may take into account admitted conduct over with exclusive venue lies in another county only if the court obtains the written permission of the prosecuting attorney for that county. A child may not be adjudicated by any court for having engaged in conduct taken into account under this section unless the conduct taken into account included conduct that took place in another county and the written permission of the prosecuting attorney of that county was not obtained.

Community Service: Texas Family Code Section 54.044

If the court places a child on probation, the court shall require as a condition of probation that the child work a specified number of hours at a community service project approved by the court and designated by the juvenile probation department. This requirement may be waived if the court finds that the child is physically or mentally incapable of participating in the project or that participating in the project will be a hardship on the child or his family or that the child has shown good cause that community service should not be required.

Note: The court may also order that the child's parent perform community service with the child.

Child Placed on Probation for Conduct Involving a Handgun:

Texas Family Code Section 54.0406

(a) If a court or jury places a child on probation for conduct that violates a penal law that includes as an element of the offense the possession, carrying, using, or exhibiting of a handgun, and if at the adjudication hearing the court or the jury affirmatively finds that the child personally possessed, carried, used, or exhibited a handgun, the court must require as a condition of probation that the child, not later than the 30th day after the date the court places the child on probation, notify the juvenile probation officer who is supervising the child of the manner in which the child acquired the handgun, including the date and place of any person involved in the acquisition. The juvenile probation officer is then to relay any relevant information regarding the handgun to the police. Your lawyer should be with you when this takes place.

Note: Information provided by the child to the juvenile probation officer regarding the acquisition of the handgun and any other information derived from that information may not be used as evidence against the child in any juvenile or criminal proceeding.

Rights of Appeal: Warning: Texas Family Code Section 54.034

Before the court may accept a child's plea or stipulation of evidence in a proceeding under this title, the court must inform the child that if the court accepts the plea or stipulation and the court makes a disposition in accordance with the agreement between the state and the child regarding the disposition of the case, the child may not appeal an order of the court pursuant to an adjudication hearing, a disposition hearing, or a hearing to modify disposition, unless the court gives the child permission to appeal; or the appeal is based on a matter raised by written motion filed before the proceeding in which the child entered the plea or agreed to the stipulation of evidence. An appeal from an order of a juvenile court is to the court of appeals and the case may be carried to the Texas Supreme Court by writ of error or upon certificate, as in civil cases generally. The requirements governing a juvenile appeal are as in civil cases generally.

Note: An appeal does not suspend the order of the juvenile court, nor does it release the child from the custody of that court or of the person, institution, or agency to whose care the child is committed, unless the juvenile court so orders. However, the appellate court may provide for a personal bond pending the appeal.

Sealing Juvenile Records: Texas Family Code Section 58.003

One of the most important things that can be done for a juvenile is to get the juvenile records sealed as soon as allowed by law.

The benefits of sealing a child's juvenile records are immense. Once the records are sealed, information relating to the arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction, are physically sealed and/or destroyed. This means that the child can start adulthood with a "clean" slate. And it also means that the child is authorized by law to say that he has never been convicted.

Section 58.003 of the Texas Family Code provides that, except for juveniles who received a determinate sentence for engaging in delinquent conduct that violated a penal law such as murder, capital murder, manslaughter, aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, injury to a child/elderly/disabled person, arson, indecency with a child, etc., or engaged in habitual felony conduct, the juvenile records may be sealed if the court finds that 2 years have elapsed since final discharge of the person or since the last official action in the person's case if there was no adjudication; and if since that time the person has not been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision and no proceeding is pending seeking conviction or adjudication.

A court may also order the sealing of records concerning a juvenile adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct that violated a penal law of the grade of felony (not including many determinate sentences) if: the person is 21 years of age or older; the person was not transferred by a juvenile court to an adult criminal court for prosecution; the records have not been used as evidence in the punishment phase of a criminal proceeding under Article 37.07, Code of Texas Criminal Procedure; and if the person has not been convicted of a penal law of the grade of felony after becoming age 17.

If a child is referred to the juvenile court for conduct constituting any offense and at the adjudication hearing (guilt/innocence) the child is found to be not guilty of each offense alleged, the court shall immediately order the sealing of all files and records relating to the case.

David Finn is board certified in criminal law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. Call today for a free initial consultation.

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Friday, March 28, 2008

School officials will not require students to write statements that can be used to prosecute them in juvenile or criminal court;

School officials will not require students to write statements that can be used to prosecute them in juvenile or criminal court;

D1: What? You would think "School officials will require students to write statements that can't or be used to prosecute them in juvenile or criminal court;

So much for educating "the Law", "the truth" or any integral derivative there of.

The Texas Legislature has "Crabs at their Dicks" AKA Special Interests that are in constantly itching.

Good the Wives are finally getting them now, so they must be sleeping around the special interests say to the legislature........then "better watch out"!


Under the settlement agreement reached by the parties, the district will enact policies and practices to ensure that the rights of Native American students are not violated and to enrich the educational experience of all students. Among the key terms of the settlement are the following:

* School officials will not require students to write statements that can be used to prosecute them in juvenile or criminal court;
* The district will hire a full-time ombudsperson, nominated by the collective Native American community, to serve as a liaison between Native American families and school officials, especially on disciplinary issues;
* An educational expert will work with school officials and Native American families to set benchmarks on improving Native American graduation rates, reducing levels of suspension and school-based arrests, and improving the overall climate for Native American students, among other goals; the expert will also conduct periodic on-site visits to ensure compliance with the agreement and monitor progress toward the goals;
* A committee of Native American parents and school officials will review all disciplinary incidents every quarter for racial disparities and, if disparities are found and cannot be explained, recommend policy changes to reduce such disparities;
* The Interwest Equity Assistance Center, funded by the U.S. Department of Education, will provide trainings for Winner students on conflict resolution and trainings for teachers on unconscious racial bias and educational equity;
* The schools will include Native American themes in the mainstream curriculum, in-school activities, and after-school activities. Additionally, the district will offer Native American Culture, History and Language class every year in the high school, taught by a Native American instructor.

Participants in the mediation included Native American families named in the class action lawsuit, members of the Winner School Board, the superintendent, and two school principals. The families were represented by the national ACLU and the ACLU of the Dakotas, and Dana L. Hanna, an attorney based in Rapid City. Additionally, the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Council and the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Education Department provided assistance and facilitation. The Winner School District was represented by Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell & Nelson, LLP, in Rapid City.

The settlement agreement will remain in effect until the district substantially complies with its terms for four consecutive years. The federal district court will have jurisdiction over the agreement during this period. The parties will be submitting a proposed consent decree to finalize the settlement, and the court will next consider any objections and decide whether to approve it.

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Friday, January 25, 2008

Sec. 36.08. Gift to Public Servant by Person Subject to his Jurisdiction.

TITLE 8. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 36. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE
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Sec. 36.08. Gift to Public Servant by Person Subject to his Jurisdiction.
(a) A public servant in an agency performing regulatory functions or conducting inspections or investigations commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows to be subject to regulation, inspection, or investigation by the public servant or his agency.
(b) A public servant in an agency having custody of prisoners commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows to be in his custody or the custody of his agency.
(c) A public servant in an agency carrying on civil or criminal litigation on behalf of government commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person against whom the public servant knows litigation is pending or contemplated by the public servant or his agency.
(d) A public servant who exercises discretion in connection with contracts, purchases, payments, claims, or other pecuniary transactions of government commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows is interested in or likely to become interested in any contract, purchase, payment, claim, or transaction involving the exercise of his discretion.
(e) A public servant who has judicial or administrative authority, who is employed by or in a tribunal having judicial or administrative authority, or who participates in the enforcement of the tribunal's decision, commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from a person the public servant knows is interested in or likely to become interested in any matter before the public servant or tribunal.
(f) A member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant governor, or a person employed by a member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant governor, or an agency of the legislature commits an offense if he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from any person.
(g) A public servant who is a hearing examiner employed by an agency performing regulatory functions and who conducts hearings in contested cases commits an offense if the public servant solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from any person who is appearing before the agency in a contested case, who is doing business with the agency, or who the public servant knows is interested in any matter before the public servant. The exception provided by Sec. 36.10(b) does not apply to a benefit under this subsection.
(h) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(i) A public servant who receives an unsolicited benefit that the public servant is prohibited from accepting under this section may donate the benefit to a governmental entity that has the authority to accept the gift or may donate the benefit to a recognized tax-exempt charitable organization formed for educational, religious, or scientific purposes.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 915, ch. 342, Sec. 11, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 3238, ch. 558, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 304, Sec. 4.04, eff. Jan. 1, 1992; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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Sunday, December 30, 2007

Chapter 174. INDIGENT DEFENSE POLICIES AND STANDARDS

TITLE 1.ADMINISTRATION

Part 1. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

Chapter 5. BUDGET AND PLANNING OFFICE

Subchapter B. STATE AND LOCAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL PROVISIONS OF TEXAS REVIEW AND COMMENT SYSTEM

1 TAC §5.195

The Office of the Governor proposes amendments to 1 TAC §5.195, concerning the Texas Review and Comment System. The proposed changes add 25 new programs for review and delete 20 programs that no longer exist or are no longer of widespread interest and conform program numbers to current listings in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. The programs proposed to be added and deleted are based on responses received from all state agencies with Texas Review and Comment System coordinators.

Denise S. Francis, State Single Point of Contact, has determined that for the first five-year period the amendments are in effect there will be no fiscal implications for state or local governments as a result of enforcing or administering the amended section.

Ms. Francis has also determined that for each year of the first five years the amendments are in effect the public benefits anticipated as a result of enforcing or administering the amended section will be a more effective use of public and financial resources and increased information sharing and coordination among affected governmental entities. There will be no effect on small businesses. There is no anticipated economic costs to persons who are required to comply with the amendments as proposed.

Comments on the proposal may be submitted to Denise S. Francis, State Single Point of Contact, Office of the Governor, Budget, Planning and Policy Division, P.O. Box 12428, Austin, Texas 78711, (512) 463-8465, dfrancis@governor.state.tx.us for a period of 30 days following publication.

The amendments are proposed under Government Code, Title 7, §772.004 and §772.005, and the Local Government Code, Chapter 391 (§391.008), which authorizes the Office of the Governor to provide for review of state and local applications for grant and loan assistance and to establish policies and guidelines for review and comment. Chapter 391 of the Local Government Code requires certain applicants for state or federal assistance to submit their applications for review to the appropriate regional planning commissions and directs the governor to issue guidelines for carrying out such reviews.

No statutes are affected by these amendments

§5.195.Program Coverage.

(a) - (b) (No change.)

(c) Federal programs included for review under TRACS pursuant to these laws, plus selected other activities, including all direct federal and state development not specifically excluded by law, are shown, respectively, in Tables I and II. Copies of these tables may be obtained from Ms. Denise S. Francis, State Single Point of Contact, Office of the Governor, Budget, Planning and Policy Division, Post Office Box 12428, Austin, Texas 78711-2428 or dfrancis@governor.state.tx.us. As required by state law (Government Code, §772.005), all state agencies must notify the Office of the Governor when applying for federal funds.

Figure: 1 TAC §5.195(c)

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on June 1, 2006.

TRD-200602998

Katherine Knight

Assistant General Counsel

Office of the Governor

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 16, 2006

For further information, please call: (512) 463-3471

Part 8. TEXAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL

Chapter 174. INDIGENT DEFENSE POLICIES AND STANDARDS

Subchapter B. CONTRACT DEFENDER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

The Task Force on Indigent Defense (Task Force) is a permanent Standing Committee of the Texas Judicial Council. The Task Force proposes new §§174.10 - 174.25, concerning the establishment of contract defender program requirements. The new sections are proposed to establish minimum requirements for the use of contract defender programs to provide indigent defense services. The rules provide for an open attorney application and selection process by the judges or juvenile board in whose court the attorney will serve. The rules also require that certain specific items be included in a contract for indigent defense services and the contract be approved by the county.

Glenna Rhea Bowman, Chief Financial Officer of the Office of Court Administration, has determined that for each year of the first five years the proposed sections are in effect, enforcing or administering the sections could have a minimal fiscal impact on local governments that choose to implement or modify procedures to align with the proposed rules. The sections do not have any foreseeable implications relating to cost or revenues of state government.

Ms. Bowman has determined that there will be no material economic costs to persons who are required to comply with the new sections, nor do the proposed sections have any anticipated adverse effect on small or micro-businesses.

Jim Bethke, Director of the Task Force, has also determined that for each of the first five-year period the rules are in effect the public benefit will be an improvement in the quality of indigent defense services because a broader range of qualified attorneys will have the opportunity to apply to provide indigent defense services under a contract.

Comments on the proposed new sections may be submitted in writing to Wesley Shackelford, Special Counsel, Task Force on Indigent Defense, P.O. Box 12066, Austin, Texas 78711-2066, or by fax to (512) 475-3450 no later than 30 days from the date that the proposal is published in the Texas Register .

1. DEFINITIONS

1 TAC §174.10

The new section is proposed under the Texas Government Code §71.060(a)(7). The Task Force interprets §71.060(a)(7) as authorizing the Task Force to develop policies and standards for providing legal representation to indigent defendants under a contract defender program.

No other statutes, articles, or codes are affected by the proposed section.

§174.10.Subchapter Definitions.

The following words and terms when used in this subchapter shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

(1) Appointing Authority. The appointing authority is the:

(A) Judge or judges who have authority to establish an indigent defense plan and approve attorneys to represent indigent defendants in criminal cases under Article 26.04, Code of Criminal Procedure; and/or

(B) Juvenile board that has authority to establish an indigent defense plan and approve attorneys to represent indigent respondents in juvenile cases under §51.102, Family Code.

(2) Contract Defender Program. Contract defender program means a system under which private attorneys, acting as independent contractors and compensated with public funds, are engaged to provide legal representation and services to a group of unspecified indigent defendants who appear before a particular court or group of courts.

(3) Contracting Authority. The contracting authority is the county or counties that have the authority to conclude a contract and to obligate funds for the provision of indigent defense services.

(4) Contractor. The contractor is an attorney, law firm, professional association, lawyer's association, law school, bar association, non-profit organization or other entity that can be bound by contract.

(5) Itemized Fee Voucher. An itemized fee voucher is any instrument, such as an invoice, that details services provided by a contractor providing indigent defense services. The itemized fee voucher may be in paper or electronic form. It shall include at a minimum all the information necessary for the county auditor or other designated official to complete the expenditure report required to be submitted to the Office of Court Administration by §71.0351, Government Code.

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on May 31, 2006.

TRD-200602984

Wesley Shackelford

Special Counsel

Texas Judicial Council

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 16, 2006

For further information, please call: (512) 936-6994

2. APPLICATION OF STANDARDS AND CONTRACTING PROCEDURES

1 TAC §§174.11 - 174.14

The new sections are proposed under the Texas Government Code §71.060(a)(7). The Task Force interprets §71.060(a)(7) as authorizing the Task Force to develop policies and standards for providing legal representation to indigent defendants under a contract defender program.

No other statutes, articles, or codes are affected by the proposed sections.

§174.11.Application of Subchapter.

This subchapter applies to all contract defender programs. This subchapter does not apply to public defender programs established and governed by Chapter 26, Code of Criminal Procedure.

§174.12.Application Process.

The appointing authority shall solicit and select contractors in accordance with the procedure governing alternative appointment programs contained in Article 26.04, Code of Criminal Procedure.

(1) Notification. The notification of the opportunity to apply (NOA) to be a contractor shall be distributed in a manner that reasonably covers all practicing members of the bar within the county or other region designated by the appointing authority. The notification shall inform attorneys of all requirements for submitting applications.

(2) Opportunity to Respond. All potential contractors shall have the same opportunity to respond to the NOA and be considered for the award of a contract.

(3) Application. All applications must be submitted in writing and shall be maintained by the appointing authority or contracting authority in accordance with the Texas State Library and Archives Commission Retention Schedule for Local Records- Local Schedule GR.

§174.13.Application Review Process.

Following the review of all applications the appointing authority shall by a majority vote select contractor(s), specify the types of cases each contractor is qualified to handle, and authorize the contracting authority to enter into a contract. The attorneys associated with the selected contractor(s) must meet the attorney qualification requirements contained in the indigent defense procedures adopted pursuant to Article 26.04, Code of Criminal Procedure. If the contract does not exclude capital cases in which the death penalty is sought, the attorneys associated with the selected contractor(s) must also meet the attorney qualifications set by the regional selection committee and be approved by the regional selection committee to represent clients in capital cases. The appointing authority shall consider at least the following factors when evaluating applications:

(1) Experience and qualifications of the applicant;

(2) Applicant's past performance in representing defendants in criminal cases;

(3) Applicant's disciplinary history with the state bar;

(4) Applicant's ability to comply with the terms of the contract; and

(5) Cost of the services under the contract.

§174.14.Awarding the Contract.

In accordance with Article 26.04(h), Code of Criminal Procedure, the contracting authority may approve the recommended contractor(s) and enter into a contract for services. The contracting authority shall enter into a contract only if it complies with these standards and all applicable law governing professional services contracts entered into by counties. A contract shall not be awarded solely on the basis of cost.

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on May 31, 2006.

TRD-200602985

Wesley Shackelford

Special Counsel

Texas Judicial Council

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 16, 2006

For further information, please call: (512) 936-6994

3. REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (EACH COMPONENT BELOW SHALL BE INCLUDED IN A CONTRACT FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES AND SHALL SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE NOA)

1 TAC §§174.15 - 174.25

The new sections are proposed under the Texas Government Code §71.060(a)(7). The Task Force interprets §71.060(a)(7) as authorizing the Task Force to develop policies and standards for providing legal representation to indigent defendants under a contract defender program.

No other statutes, articles, or codes are affected by the proposed sections.

§174.15.Parties.

Identify the appointing authority, contracting authority, and contractor.

§174.16.Term of Contract.

The contract shall specify the term of the contract, including any provision for extensions, and a provision for terminating the contract by either party.

§174.17.Scope of Contract.

The contract shall specify the categories of cases in which the contractor is to provide services.

§174.18.Minimum Attorney Qualifications.

The contract shall specify minimum qualifications for attorneys covered by the contract and require such attorneys to maintain the qualifications during the term of the contract. The qualifications shall equal or exceed the qualifications provided in the indigent defense procedures adopted pursuant to Article 26.04, Code of Criminal Procedure. If the contract does not exclude capital cases in which the death penalty is sought, the qualifications shall equal or exceed the minimum attorney qualifications set by the regional selection committee and the attorneys covered by the contract shall be required to be on the list of attorneys approved by the regional selection committee to represent clients in capital cases. If a contract covers services provided by more than one attorney, qualifications may be graduated according to the seriousness of offense and each attorney shall be required to meet and maintain only those qualifications established for the offense level(s) for which the attorney is approved to provide defense services.

§174.19.Duration of Representation.

The contract shall specify that the contractor has the responsibility to complete all cases once representation is commenced during the term of the contract, unless an attorney covered by the contract is relieved or replaced in accordance with Article 26.04(j)(2), Code of Criminal Procedure.

§174.20.Substitution of Attorneys.

The contract shall identify the attorney(s) who will perform legal representation in each category of case covered by the contract and prohibit the substitution of other attorneys without prior approval by a majority of the appointing authority. Nothing in the contract shall prohibit an attorney covered by the contract from being relieved or replaced in accordance with Article 26.04(j)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

§174.21.Caseload Limitations.

The contract shall set the maximum number of cases or workload each attorney may be required to handle pursuant to the contract.

§174.22.Standards of Representation.

The contract shall require that the contractor provide zealous legal representation to all clients in a professional, skilled manner consistent with all applicable laws and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

§174.23.Conflicts of Interest.

The contract shall state a policy to assure that the contractor and its attorneys do not provide representation to defendants when doing so would involve a conflict of interest.

§174.24.Investigators and Experts.

The contract shall specify how investigation services and experts that are necessary to provide competent representation will be made available in a manner consistent with Article 26.05(d), Code of Criminal Procedure.

§174.25.Compensation and Payment Processes.

The contract shall set the amount of compensation to be paid to the contractor and the designated method and timing of payment. The contract shall state that the contractor shall be required to submit an itemized fee voucher. The voucher must be approved by a member of the appointing authority prior to being forwarded to the county financial officer for approval and payment. The contract shall also specify how a contractor is to be compensated for cases assigned but not disposed within the term of the contract as provided in §174.19 of this subchapter.

This agency hereby certifies that the proposal has been reviewed by legal counsel and found to be within the agency's legal authority to adopt.

Filed with the Office of the Secretary of State on May 31, 2006.

TRD-200602987

Wesley Shackelford

Special Counsel

Texas Judicial Council

Earliest possible date of adoption: July 16, 2006

For further information, please call: (512) 936-6994

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Thursday, August 02, 2007

The alignment of AKS with standardized assessments, such as ITBS, SAT I and ACT, ensures that GCPS students are well prepared for these measurements..

Academic Knowledge & Skills

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437 Old Peachtree Road NW
Suwanee, GA
30024-2978

(678) 301-6000


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All Rights Reserved



Academic Knowledge & Skills (AKS)


What are the Academic Knowledge and Skills?
Gwinnett’s curriculum for grades K-12 is called the Academic Knowledge and Skills (AKS). The AKS for each grade level (or subject area at the high school level) spell out the essential things students are expected to know and be able to do in that particular grade or subject. They offer a solid base on which teachers build rich curricular experiences. Teachers use curriculum guides, textbooks, technology, and other materials to teach the AKS and to make sure every student is learning to his or her potential. Because the AKS detail exactly what a child is expected to learn, teachers can tailor the classroom experience to meet a child’s individual needs.


Why are the Academic Knowledge and Skills important for our students?
The Academic Knowledge and Skills (AKS) were developed in response to Gwinnett County Public Schools' mission statement:

The mission of Gwinnett County Public Schools is to pursue excellence in academic knowledge, skills, and behavior for each student resulting in measured improvement against local, national, and world-class standards.


How are the Academic Knowledge and Skills developed?
The AKS are developed by our teachers, with input from our parents and community. Beginning in 1995, teams of teachers have met each year to review the AKS for their grade level and/or subject area. The first teams reviewed the existing curriculum to propose what was essential knowledge and skills for each grade level—kindergarten through 12th grade—and every course. These knowledge and skills were also reviewed for correlations with state-required curriculum and assessments as well as local, national, and world-class educational standards. Teachers, parents, and community members throughout the district then evaluated the proposed AKS, providing feedback on what they believed to be the essential curriculum for all students. The final proposed versions of the AKS were presented to the Gwinnett Educational Management System (GEMS) Oversight Committee, comprised of representatives from the community and school system, for validation. This process is repeated each year to address any revisions or enhancements that teachers and/or the community believe are needed to improve our curriculum. The GEMS Committee then recommends the validated revisions to the superintendent, who presents recommendations to the Board of Education for adoption and implementation in the subsequent school year. With this process for curriculum development and improvement in place, parents can be assured that the curriculum their child is learning in a Gwinnett County classroom will be essential to his or her learning and sanctioned by our educators, parents, and the community.


How are the Academic Knowledge and Skills used in the classroom?
The AKS are the standards for academic excellence for all students in Gwinnett County Public Schools. They are what teachers are to teach and students are to learn. In every GCPS classroom, instruction and assessment are tailored so that all students learn the AKS. The alignment of AKS with standardized assessments, such as ITBS, SAT I and ACT, ensures that GCPS students are well prepared for these measurements of achievement. The AKS are also aligned with the state-mandated Georgia Performance Standards (GPS) and Quality Core Curriculum (QCC), assuring that students are prepared for state tests, such as the Georgia High School Graduation Test (GHSGT) and the Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT).


How do the Academic Knowledge and Skills support Character Education?
Gwinnett County Public Schools supports a mandate from the Georgia General Assembly requiring all schools to teach character education. The school system believes that society and culture are tied together through common threads that guide the way we live, work, and learn. These common beliefs are taught at home and reinforced by the community, schools, religious institutions, and youth service groups. These basic tenets guide the way Gwinnett County teachers teach and the way the school system conducts the business of teaching and learning. Character education values are thoroughly embedded in the AKS and are correlated to the AKS in the grade level AKS books. The state mandated law is Section 20-2-145 of the Georgia State Code as amended in 1999 by actions of the Georgia General Assembly. The character education traits are courage, self-control, school pride, patriotism, courtesy, respect for the environment, citizenship, compassion, respect for the creator, honesty, tolerance, patience, fairness, diligence, creativity, respect for others, generosity, sportsmanship, cooperation, punctuality, loyalty, kindness, cleanliness, perseverance, self-respect, cheerfulness, and virtue.

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Saturday, May 19, 2007

why not pay for villa's law school

County SID No. : 10072966
Name : VILLA, RICARDO
Cause No. : 96001746 - B Age : 67
Date of Birth : 12/24/1940
Degree of Off. F1
Offense Desc. AGG SEXUAL ASSLT CHILD
Arrest Date
Complaint No. 000000
Bond Req. $ 20000.00
Court Date
Fine $ 0.00
Court Cost $ 0.00
Sentencing Time
Probation Time
Sentence Date
Disposition CHANGE INDICT/INFOR.
Degree of Off. F1
Offense Desc. AGG SEXUAL ASSLT CHILD
Arrest Date 06/14/1996
Complaint No. 000000
Bond Req. $ 20000.00
Court Date
Fine $ 0.00
Court Cost $ 0.00
Sentencing Time
Probation Time
Sentence Date
Disposition ACQUITTAL
Degree of Off. F1
Offense Desc. AGG SEXUAL ASSLT CHILD
Arrest Date 06/14/1996
Complaint No. 000000
Bond Req. $ 0.00
Court Date
Fine $ 0.00
Court Cost $ 0.00
Sentencing Time
Probation Time
Sentence Date
Disposition ACQUITTAL
Entry No. Comments Entry Date
0001 s:COURT B computer assigned 06/06/1996
0002 REINDICTED 06/06/1996
0003 s:CAPIAS ISSUED 06/11/1996
0004 s:PRECEPT/INDICTMENT ISSUED 06/11/1996
0005 PRECEPT FILED RETURNED NOT IN JAIL 06/13/1996
0006 CAPIAS AND PRECEPT FILED IN JAIL 06/18/1996
0007 APPEARANCE BAIL BOND FILED $20.000 KEN BOTARY ATTY 06/19/1996
0008 PSI FILED 07/01/1996
0009 MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION 07/23/1996
0010 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR DISCOVERY & INSPECTION 27/486 07/23/1996
0011 MOTION TO QUASH INDICTMENT 07/25/1996
0012 MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 07/25/1996
0013 DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR NOTICE UNDER RULE 404B 07/25/1996
0014 MOTION TO QUASH INDICTMENT 07/25/1996
0015 DEFENDANTS APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA 07/29/1996
0016 CASE CALLED, TO BE RESET 07/31/1996
0017 KEN BOTARY RETAINED 08/07/1996
0018 MOTION FOR INSPECTION OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 08/26/1996
0019 MOTION FOR FORENSIC TESTING 08/26/1996
0020 DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY 09/13/1996
0021 SECOND MOTION FOR DISCOVERY & INSPECTION 09/13/1996
0022 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE 10/03/1996
0023 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE 10/03/1996
0024 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE O/C 10/04/1996
0025 DEFENDANTS APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA 10/08/1996
0026 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS DEFT 10/09/1996
0027 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 1 COPY LETTER TO MR. VALDEZ FROM YOLANDA 10/10/1996
0028 ***F. GONZALEZ 10/10/1996
0029 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 2 COPY LETTER TO MS. GONZALEZ FROM 10/10/1996
0030 ***MR. VALDEZ 10/10/1996
0031 ORDER TO SURRENDER MEDICAL RECORDS CM28/87 10/28/1996
0032 STATE'S NOTICE OF POSSIBLE "EXTRANEOUS" OFFENSES WHICH MAY 11/15/1996
0033 ***OR MAY NOT BE OFFERED AT TRIAL 11/15/1996
0034 ORDER TO SURRENDER MDICAL RECORDS 27/1020 10/11/1996
0035 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS DEFT 03/31/1997
0036 NOTICE OF RESETTING ON JULY 14, 1997 AT 9:30 AM 03/02/1997
0037 THIRD MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION 05/22/1997
0038 -------------------------------------------- 05/22/1997
0039 NOTICE OF RESETTING ON JULY 14, 1997 AT 9:30 AM 29/245 03/02/1997
0040 ORDER ON MOTION FOR DISCOVERY & INSPECTION CM29/669 05/28/1997
0041 APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA STATE 2 07/08/1997
0042 MOTION TO SEAL DOCUMENT & ORDER (SIGNED 7-14-97) CM30/859 07/11/1997
0043 HAND WRITTEN ORDER FOR ATTACHMENT 07/18/1997
0044 WITNESS ATTACHMENT ISSUED (JANET PEREZ) INSTANTER 07/18/1997
0045 RECALLED WITNESS ATTACHMENT WITH LAURA FROM WARRANTS & MERU 07/18/1997
0046 ***AT 5:10 PM 07/18/1997
0047 APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA STATE 07/24/1997
0048 TRIAL PACK: AFFIDAVIT ON DEFENDANTS COMPREHENSION OF THE 07/14/1997
0049 ***ENGLISH LANGUAGE FILED 07/14/1997
0050 APPLICATION FOR PROBATION FILED 07/14/1997
0051 ELECTION FOR PUNISHMENT FILED 07/14/1997
0052 JURY STRIKES & JURY CHOSEN 07/15/1997
0053 JURY INFORMATION SHEETS SEALED IN TWO (2) ENVELOPES 07/15/1997
0054 CHARGE READ AT 12:38 PM 07/25/1997
0055 JURY DELIBERATING AT 2:17 PM 07/25/1997
0056 9 NOTES FROM JURY 07/25/1997
0057 JURY RECESSED UNTIL MONDAY MORNING 7-28-97 AT 9:00 AM 07/25/1997
0058 4 JURY NOTES 07/28/1997
0059 VERDICT ON COUNT I: NOT GUILTY 07/28/1997
0060 VERDICT ON COUNT II: DEADLOCK 07/28/1997
0061 (JURY DISCHARGED AFTER RECEIVING VERDICT ON COUNT I) 07/28/1997
0062 SX1 BLACK JEANS 07/29/1997
0063 SX2 WHITE UNDERWEAR WITH FECES 07/29/1997
0064 SX3 BLACKM LONG-SLEEVED SHIRT 07/29/1997
0065 SX4 WHITE T-SHIRT 07/29/1997
0066 SX5 SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT 07/29/1997
0067 SX6 VIAL WITH BLOOD 07/29/1997
0068 SX7 ENVELOPE WITH PUBIC HAIR 07/29/1997
0069 SX8 ENVELOPE WHT BLOODSTAINS, PUBIC HAIRS 07/29/1997
0070 SX9 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 07/29/1997
0071 SX10 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 07/29/1997
0072 SX11 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 07/29/1997
0073 SX12 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 07/29/1997
0074 SX13 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 07/29/1997
0075 SX15 YELLOW ENVELOPE WITH SAMPLES 07/29/1997
0076 DX1 HANDWRITTEN NOTE 07/29/1997
0077 DX2 LARGE DEAGRAM 07/29/1997
0078 DX3 VIDEOTAPE OF AUDITORIUM 07/29/1997
0079 DX4 - DX6 PHOTOGRAPHS 07/29/1997
0080 DX7 NOCHE DE GALA BROCHURE 07/29/1997
0081 DX8 LARGE DIAGRAM - STUDIO 07/29/1997
0082 DX9 & DX10 POSTER WITH 4 PHOTOGRAPHS 07/29/1997
0083 DX11 POSTER WITH 2 PHOTOGRAPHS 07/29/1997
0084 DX12 - DX13 POSTERS WITH 3 PHOTOGRAPHS EACH 07/29/1997
0085 DX14 TELEPHONE STATEMENT 07/29/1997
0086 DX15 NOTICE TO DANCERS 07/29/1997
0087 DX16 LETTER FROM MARIACHIES 07/29/1997
0088 DX17 DEPOSIT SLIP 07/29/1997
0089 DX19 & DX20 LARGE TIME LINE POSTERS 07/29/1997
0090 DX21 PROGRAM 07/29/1997
0091 (ALL EXHIBITS TAKEN TO 5TH FLOOR TO CAGE) 07/30/1997
0092 WITNESS ATTACHMENT FILED RETURNED RECALLED AUTH ESTELLA 08/06/1997
0093 MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 09/18/1997
0094 STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 09/19/1997
0095 ORDER ON MTN FOR CONTINUANCE 30/879 09/22/1997
0096 DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR INSPECTION OF CHEMICAL ANALYSI 01/08/1998
0097 ORD SETTING HEARING DATE ON JAN. 30, 1998 31/653 01/22/1998
0098 ORDER ON DFTS MTN FOR INSPECTION OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 31/654 01/30/1998
0099 MOTION TO W/DRW EXHIBITS 04/28/1998
0100 JURY STRIKES & JURY CHOOSEN 05/04/1998
0101 TRIAL PACK FILED 05/04/1998
0102 DEFENDANT PLED NOT GUILTY 05/04/1998
0103 CHARGE OF THE COURT READ AT 1:08 PM 05/11/1998
0104 2 NOTES FILED 05/11/1998
0105 VERDICT AT 5:43 PM: NOT GUILTY 05/11/1998
0106 PX1 BLACK JEANS 05/12/1998
0107 PX2 WHITE UNDERWEAR W/FECES & TOILET PAPER 05/12/1998
0108 PX3 BLACK LONG SLEEVED SHIRT 05/12/1998
0109 PX4 WHITE T SHIRT 05/12/1998
0110 PX5 SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT 05/12/1998
0111 PX6 VIAL WITH BLOOD 05/12/1998
0112 PX7 ENVELOPE WITH PUBIC HAIR 05/12/1998
0113 PX8 TIME SHEET 05/12/1998
0114 PX9 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 05/12/1998
0115 PX10 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 05/12/1998
0116 PX11 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 05/12/1998
0117 PX12 LARGE PHOTOGRAPH 05/12/1998
0118 DC1 LARGE PHOTO 05/12/1998
0119 DX3 NOTE (HANDWRITTEN) 05/12/1998
0120 DX4 SMALL PHOTOGRAPH 05/12/1998
0121 DX5 POSTER BOARD WITH PHOTOS 05/12/1998
0122 DX6 POSTER BOARD W/PHOTOS 05/12/1998
0123 DX7 INSTRUCTION PAMPHLET 05/12/1998
0124 DX8 NOCHE DE GALA PAMPLET 05/12/1998
0125 DX9 BUSINESS CARDS (2) 05/12/1998
0126 DX10 TELEPHONE BILL 05/12/1998
0127 DX11 CV GINSLOG 05/12/1998
0128 DX12 DX1 NEWSPAPER ARTICLE (ADMITTED 5-4-98) 05/12/1998
0129 ALL EXHIBITS TAKEN TO 5TH FLOOR CAGE DISPD 05/12/1998
0130 JUDGMENT CM33/861-862 11/20/1998
0131 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW EXHIBITS-WALKED BY K BOTARY 03/19/2007
0132 **TO CT SH 03/19/2007
0133 ORD TO W/DRAW EXHIBITS (IMAGED) 03/19/2007
0134 AMENDED ORD TO W/DRAW EXHIBITS (IMAGED) 04/02/2007

County SID No. : 10041930

Nueces County Seal Nueces County Courthouse 901 Leopard Corpus Christi, TX 78401 361.888.0111

Log Out
CR0095003578H 10041930
County SID No. : 10041930
Name : PLAISTED, JAMES REGINALD
Cause No. : 95003578 - H Age : 58
Date of Birth : 01/18/1949
Degree of Off. F2
Offense Desc. INDECENCY WITH A CHILD SEXUAL CONTACT
Arrest Date
Complaint No. 000000
Bond Req. $ 75000.00
Court Date
Fine $ 0.00
Court Cost $ 0.00
Sentencing Time 40 Years
Probation Time
Sentence Date 12/07/1995
Disposition TDC
Entry No. Comments Entry Date
0001 s:COURT H selected from pending case 95000325 10/19/1995
0002 s:CAPIAS ISSUED 10/25/1995
0003 s:PRECEPT/INDICTMENT ISSUED 10/25/1995
0004 CAPIAS/PRECEPT RTN FILED SCVD IN JAIL 11/03/1995
0005 WAIVER OF ARRAIGNMENT 11/08/1995
0006 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE 11/20/1995
0007 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE 11/20/1995
0008 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE (2) 11/20/1995
0009 NOTICE 11/21/1995
0010 TEX R. CRIM.EVID. 902(10) NOTICE 11/21/1995
0011 APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA STATE 11/28/1995
0012 APPLICATION FOR SUBPOENA STATE (2) 11/30/1995
0013 APPLICATION FOR SUBPONEAS STATE 12/01/1995
0014 ST APPL FOR SUBP 12/01/1995
0015 MTN TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD 12/01/1995
0016 40YRS.TDCJ C/C 92CR1926,92CR1927,92CR1928,95CR325 12/07/1995
0017 PLEA PAK,SX1&SX2 WAIVER OF APPEAL 12/07/1995
0018 PSI FILED 12/14/1995
0019 WALKED TDC PEN PAK TO JAIL 12/14/1995
0020 NOTICE OF APPEAL 12/29/1995
0021 NOTICE TAKEN TO COURT OF APPEALS 01/03/1996
0022 ORDER DENYING REQUEST TO APPEAL 38/819 01/08/1996
0023 MOTION TO BE RELEASED AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD 01/17/1996
0024 TRANSCRIPT AND SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSC TAKEN TO COURT OF APPEALS 01/22/1996
0025 A. AGUILO FROM DA'S CHECK OUT TRANSCRIPT & SUPP. TRANSCRIPT 01/23/1996
0026 A. AGUILO RETURNED TRANSCRIPT & SUPP TRANSCRIPT 01/24/1996
0027 ORDER ABATING APPEAL 02/13/1996
0028 ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY FOR APPEAL RICK HOLSTEIN 39/39 02/13/1996
0029 C/COPY OF ORDER APPOINTING ATTY. TAKEN TO COURT OF APPEALS 02/16/1996
0030 V 02/16/1996
0031 FILE CHECKED OUT BY A. AGUILO 02/23/1996
0032 STATEMENT OF FACTS FILED 03/07/1996
0033 CHECKED OUT BY ADOLF DA 06/21/1996
0034 MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 07/03/1996
0035 FILE BROUGHT BACK 07/05/1996
0036 SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSCRIPT TAKEN TO COURT OF APPEALS 07/08/1996
0037 COPY OF STATEMENT OF FACTS MAILED TO DEFENDANT 07/18/1996
0038 COPY OF FILE MAILED TO DEFENDANT 08/12/1996
0039 OPINION FILED 10/17/1996
0040 MANDATE FILED (APPEAL DISMISSED) 01/10/1997
0041 C/C OF JUDGMENT MAILED TO TDC 01/23/1997
0042 TRANSCRIPT PUT IN BOX/CAGE 5TH FLOOR 01/27/1997
0043 LETTER FROM ADVANATGE RCDS REQUESTING COPIES C/C COPIES 04/16/1997
0044 ----- MAILED TO THEM (JASSO) 04/16/1997
0045 STATEMENT OF FACTS PLACED IN BOX/2ND FLOOR 09/29/2000
0046 REQUEST FROM AMY NIEMANN FOR COPIES/COPIES MAILED - JASSO 04/26/2001

Monday, April 16, 2007

who answers.......while....kNoWee ~coyote plots to dance the skip with the LOOt

yeah mr. noe answer that or will you live up to your name and "SKIP" the d'bate?

hey now your an all star get your game on lets play.....

remember......winners never cheat and cheaters never win.... and if you doubt what i say... wiley coyote thought the same thing...... so do you got the balls to do the right thing?

do ya?

sea sea & CC i. s.d. sittin a tree

k i ss i n g.......first comes

GOD then the TRUTH

Saturday, April 07, 2007

The trustees' refusal to lay out the cards is beyond irritating; it borders on the outrageous.

Bring CCISD selection process into light of day

The secrecy surrounding the current search for a new superintendent is indefensible. Did we learn nothing from the previous fiasco?

April 6, 2007


The selection process that will ultimately produce a finalist for superintendent of the Corpus Christi Independent School District is up and running.

On Wednesday the trustees interviewed four candidates for the post - including Scott Elliff, interim superintendent since the resignation of Jesus Chavez in February 2006.



That much we know of a certainty. It also seems safe to assume that the four individuals in question could fairly be considered the finalists from the field of 25 applicants who were being considered for the position.

However, should we at this late date be dealing in "seems" and "assume" when it comes to the process that will determine who is to lead the city's largest school district?

The question arises: Why has the Board of Trustees gone to such lengths to keep the public from getting anything more than a fleeting glimpse of the action? After all, the previous superinten-dent hunt, which saw Shoney Bria first accept, then decline the post, was grievously marred by the secrecy that surrounded it.

But - again - the board apparently believes that the releasing of names could prove ruinous for the applicants back in their home districts.

That, however, looks more and more like a smoke screen. School districts throughout the length and breadth of the nation are seeking leaders, and up-and-coming administrators are looking to move into superintendencies in larger districts.

The curtain of confidentiality is, at long last, nonsensical. More to the point, it does a disservice to the community. Consider: As matters now stand, we do not even know how many of the contenders will find favor with the trustees and be presented to the public. It could be one. Then again, it could be two, perhaps even three.

Concern for confidentiality is, or should be, trumped by another, vastly more important consideration: the public's right to know, and its right to have at least some role to play in the process.

The trustees' refusal to lay out the cards is beyond irritating; it borders on the outrageous.

Particularly disturbing is the fact that three new trustees elected last year - Carol Scott, John Longoria and Dwayne Hargis, all of whom emphasized their intent to bring new openness to the board - appear to have bought into the mum's-the-word ethos that has dominated this exercise.

To be sure, they (and their colleagues) could, and should, reverse their field - but the time remaining in which to keep this selection process from being grievously tainted is rapidly running out.

Thursday, March 22, 2007

Commissioner Peggy Banales voted against the resolution~ looks like Loyd's agenda is billed retroactive to cover past projects and plain to see.......

Officials support new bid process

Commissioners approve dropping bid-reading rule

By Beth Wilson Caller-Times
March 22, 2007


Nueces County commissioners passed a resolution Wednesday to support state legislation removing requirements to read construction bid costs at the beginning of the selection process and allowing alternative construction methods for projects funded by certificates of obligation.

The resolution supports an amended version of legislation filed by Rep. Solomon Ortiz Jr. on March 9 that stemmed from the legal issues surrounding the Richard M. Borchard Regional Fairgrounds. The original bill would have removed the requirement that governments read aloud fees and pricing when opening construction bids and would have applied to all contracts approved since September 2003.



Commissioners voted 4-1 to support an amended bill that removes the retroactive wording and makes it optional to read the fees on opening, but requires them to be read when the selection process concludes.

County Judge Loyd Neal said he supported the resolution because of the modifications.

"I simply could not support that," he said of the retroactive feature included in the bill's first draft.

Commissioner Peggy Banales voted against the resolution, saying she was in favor of the legislation but wanted to keep the retroactive wording to cover existing projects.

After reports last week revealed not all the commissioners had seen the legislation, Ortiz said he would not move forward on the legislation until he had 100 percent support from the court. Ortiz has said he assumed the bill had the entire court's support when his uncle, Commissioner Oscar Ortiz, hand-delivered it to him in Austin.

In a statement Wednesday, Rep. Ortiz said he now will ask for a hearing on the bill as soon as it is referred to a committee.

"When and whether the bill is set for a hearing is left to the discretion of the committee chairman," the statement said. "When and if it is set for a hearing, I will submit a substitute bill with the wording the county supported in its resolution."

Ortiz said he considers support of the legislation to be unanimous because Banales indicated she approved of its intent.

Both versions of the legislation were written by the Nueces County Attorney's Office. The legislation was drafted to clarify when prices must be read and to clear up conflicting statutes about whether governments may use the construction manager-at-risk method for projects, said County Attorney Laura Garza Jimenez.

Garza Jimenez said Oscar Ortiz requested her office draft a bill that would clarify some of the issues raised in a lawsuit filed last month by philanthropist and businessman William "Dusty" Durrill regarding the county fairgrounds project. The retroactive wording was added to protect ongoing construction manager-at-risk projects across the state, including the county's fairgrounds project, she said.

The manager-at-risk method selects a contractor before detailing plans. Competitive bidding requires details be presented before a contractor is selected so all contractors have equal opportunity to evaluate projects before submitting a bid.

Durrill's lawsuit claimed the county violated state law requiring competitive bidding when it used the construction manager-at-risk method for the fairgrounds. A settlement agreement was signed by both parties Wednesday.

"The intent was not to do away with the Durrill lawsuit," Garza Jimenez said.

The county voided two fairgrounds contracts in January after Fulton Coastcon Construction filed suit. In reviewing the contracts for that suit, the county determined it failed to read the bid pricing aloud when opening the bids, and voted to re-do the bids and contracts.

Former County Commissioner Joe McComb, who lost the House race to Rep. Ortiz, attended Wednesday's meeting and told commissioners he supported the legislation and understands the need for clarification based on his time on the court.

"Nueces County should take the lead to clarify the issue," McComb said.

Contact Beth Wilson at 886-3748 or HYPERLINK mailto:wilsonb@caller.com wilsonb@caller.com.

Friday, February 09, 2007

taxpayers:notice he intends 2 bring suit Y $$$ 4 ABC is validity of the claim, he may recover it back, if the assessment was erroneous or illegal, $$

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United States v. California (91-2003), 507 U.S. 746 (1993).
Syllabus
Opinion
[ O'Connor ]
HTML version
WordPerfect version HTML version
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 91-2003

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA and CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

[April 26, 1993]

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States has established three Naval Petroleum Reserves in California and Wyoming, one ofwhich is Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1, located in Kern County, California. 10 U.S.C. § 7420. First through the Department of the Navy and later through the Department of Energy, the United States contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to manage oil drilling operations at Reserve No. 1 from 1975 to 1985. Under the contract, WBEC received an annual fixed fee plus reimbursement for costs, which the contract defined to include state sales and use taxes.

California assessed approximately $14 million in sales and use taxes, pursuant to Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann.

§ 6384 (West 1987), against WBEC for the years 1975 through 1981. The State informed WBEC of the tax deficiencies through two notices, one issued in July 1978 and the other in December 1982. WBEC, at the direction of the United States, applied to the California Board of Equalization for administrative redetermination of the assessments, see Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 6932 (West 1987). WBEC argued that the State had misapplied its own law, taxing property that was outside the scope of § 6384. The Board of Equalization denied each claim, with minor exceptions. Thereafter, WBEC paid the assessments under protest, using funds the Federal Government provided. It then filed timely actions in state court. In January 1988, the State and WBEC stipulated to a $3 million refund, for erroneous assessments on property that WBEC had purchased and that Government personnel had installed, and to dismissal of both actions without prejudice. The remaining $11 million resulted from assessments on property that WBEC had purchased and that private subcontractors, managed by WBEC, had installed.

In May 1988, the United States filed suit in the Eastern District of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that California had classified and taxed WBEC erroneously under California law and that the taxed property actually was exempt. It sought a refund of the $11 million plus interest. In the course of the suit, the United States argued it was entitled to recovery based on the federal common law cause of action for money had and received. The District Court rejected both grounds for recovery and granted summary judgment for the State.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 932 F. 2d 1346 (1991). The court began by noting that the Government did not claim that either it or WBEC was constitutionally immune from the tax, an argument this Court rejected in United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). 932 F. 2d, at 1347-1348. Because the UnitedStates lacked "a colorable constitutional challenge," id., at 1349, the Court of Appeals looked to whether federal common law might provide a cause of action. It declined to accept the Government's argument that the simple act of disbursing federal funds was a "constitutional function" that created a federal interest in conflict with state law. The Government had done no more than pay state taxes pursuant to state law; this did not rise to the level of a federal interest requiring the application of federal law. Ibid. The Court of Appeals then held that the Government could not maintain a quasi contract cause of action because the facts did not support a claim of unjust enrichment. Among other things, "WBEC, backed throughout by the United States, had a fair chance to argue against the validity of the assessments in the administrative and state court proceedings." Id., at 1350. Finally, the Court of Appeals relied on the fact that the Government's quasi contract argument was "posited upon the interpretation of a state created exemption from a state[ ]created sales tax." Ibid. The court found that the State's claim filing requirements, including that a court action be filed within 90 days of an administrative denial, were conditions precedent to a cause of action for a tax refund. Id., at 1350-1351. The Government had failed to satisfy the conditions; therefore, the Court of Appeals held, the Government had no state cause of action and no quasi contract action. "Since federal statutes of limitations become determinative only after the government acquires a cause of action, and since the United States never acquired a cause of action," the court reasoned, the six year statute of limitations of "28 U.S.C. § 2415 does not apply." Id., at 1351.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a factually similar case, recently had reached the opposite conclusion. Id., at 1351-1352. In United States v. Broward County, 901 F. 2d 1005 (1990), the Eleventh Circuit rejected theargument on which the Ninth Circuit relied and held that the Government had a "federal common law cause of action in quasi contract for money had and received." Id., at 1008-1009. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 506 U. S. ___ (1992).

The Government concedes that it could have intervened in WBEC's administrative and state court proceedings. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. But it argues that whether it complied with state procedural requirements or whether it could have intervened is irrelevant, because it has a federal right to recover the taxes under the federal common law cause of action for money had and received (also known as indebitatus assumpsit). Prior to the creation of federal administrative and statutory remedies for the recovery of federal taxes, this Court held that a taxpayer could bring an action for money had and received to recover erroneously or illegally assessed taxes. In City of Philadelphia v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 720 (1867), the Court stated:

"[The] [a]ppropriate remedy to recover back money paid [to federal tax collectors] under protest on account of duties or taxes erroneously or illegally assessed, is an action of assumpsit for money had and received. Where the party voluntarily pays the money, he is without remedy; but if he pays it by compulsion of law, or under protest, or with notice that he intends to bring suit to test the validity of the claim, he may recover it back, if the assessment was erroneous or illegal, in an action of assumpsit for money had and received." Id., at 731-732 (citing Elliott v. Swartout, 10 Pet. 137, 150 (1836)).

The Government reasons that it paid WBEC's taxes, that the taxes were wrongfully assessed, and that therefore it may recover the funds used to pay those taxes. Since an action for money had and received is based on a contractimplied in law, see Bayne v. United States, 93 U.S. 642, 643 (1876), the Government further reasons that its claims are governed by the 6 year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), and not the 90-day limitation period in the California Code.

The taxpayers in both City of Philadelphia and the case on which it relies, Elliott v. Swartout, were attempting to recover money they had paid under protest to the federal tax collector in settlement of tax assessments erroneously made against them. In this case, by contrast, the taxpayer--WBEC--has had its day in court and gone home. The Government attempts to recover money it paid in reimbursement for state tax assessments against the contractor, even though the contractor already has challenged the assessment and accepted a resolution of its claims. The Government contends that, because its contract with WBEC involved an advanced funding arrangement, the Government was the one that actually paid the state taxes. Because the disbursement of federal funds is involved, the Government asserts, the federal action for money had and received is appropriate. Even assuming that federal courts may entertain a federal common law action for the recovery of state taxes paid by the Government, we conclude that a federal action is inappropriate here because the Government is in no better position than as a subrogee of its contractor WBEC.

The management contract between the Government and WBEC is in all relevant respects identical to the contracts we discussed in United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). There, as here, the State had imposed sales and use taxes on private contractors managing Department of Energy sites. Like WBEC, two of the contractors received costs plus a fixed fee. Id., at 723-724. Like WBEC's contracts, the contracts provided that title to all tangible personal property passed directly from the vendor to the Government. Id., at 724. "Finally, and most importantly, the contracts use[d] a so called `advancedfunding' procedure to meet contractor costs." Id., at 725. The contractors paid creditors and employees with drafts drawn on a special bank account in which the Government deposited funds, so that only federal funds were expended when the contractors made purchases. Id., at 726. Compare App. 142-143 (Declaration of Kenneth Meeks in Support of United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, describing similar funding operations with WBEC).

In New Mexico, the Government brought an action arguing that the contractors' expenditures, other than those made out of the fixed fees, were constitutionally immune from taxation. We noted that the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation is "one that has been marked from the beginning by inconsistent decisions and excessively delicate distinctions." 455 U. S., at 730. After surveying our "confusing" precedents, we concluded it was time to return to the underlying constitutional principle of tax immunity: A State may not lay a tax " `directly upon the United States.' " Id., at 733 (quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943)). But whereas the Government is absolutely immune from direct taxes, it is not immune from taxes merely because they have an "effect" on it, or "even because the Federal Government shoulders the entire economic burden of the levy." 455 U. S., at 734. In fact, it is "constitutionally irrelevant that the United States reimburse[s] all the contractor's expenditures, including those going to meet the tax." Ibid. (citing Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941)). Tax immunity is "appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities." 455 U. S., at 735.

It is beyond peradventure that California did not tax--indeed, could not have taxed--the Federal Government in this case. California taxed WBEC. And theGovernment's voluntary agreement to reimburse (or even fund in advance) WBEC for those taxes does not make the Government's payments direct disbursements of federal funds to the State. We addressed an analogous indemnification relationship in Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943). The United States had contracted with a private corporation to operate a Maritime Commission vessel. A Customs Inspector suffered injuries on the vessel that led to his death, and his widow brought a maritime tort action against the private corporation. In defense, respondent contended "that if the judgment against [it] stands, the United States ultimately will have to pay it by reason of provisions of the contract between respondent and the [Maritime] Commission. It is therefore urged that the United States is the real party in interest." Id., at 582. We rejected respondent's argument that petitioner could be deprived of her cause of action by reason of the contract. "Immunity from suit on a cause of action which the law creates cannot be so readily obtained." Id., at 583. Absent congressional action, we would not allow "concessions made by contracting officers of the government" to make such a "basic alteration" in the law. Id., at 584.

We conclude from Brady and New Mexico that the Government cannot use the existence of an obligation to indemnify WBEC to create a federal cause of action for money had and received to recover state taxes paid by WBEC any more than the Roosevelt Steamship Company could use the existence of a right to indemnity from the Government to defeat a claim for recovery. See Brady, supra, at 584. Cf. Farid v. Smith, 850 F. 2d 917, 923 (CA2 1988) (a State's decision to indemnify its public servants does not confer Eleventh Amendment immunity on state officials sued in their personal capacity).

Although the Government does not cite Brady, it does cite two other cases that suggest the lesson of Brady might not apply in an action for money had and received. According to the Government, Bayne v. United States, 93 U.S. 642 (1877), and Gaines v. Miller, 111 U.S. 395 (1884), stand for the proposition that an action for money had and received may "be employed by the United States to recover money from a third party who received federal funds that had been misappropriated by a government agent." Brief for United States 14. We find these cases inapposite. In Bayne, an Army paymaster withdrew money from the paymaster's account, endorsed the checks in blank, and sent them to Merchant's Bank with instructions to credit the account of Bayne & Co. The Court affirmed the Government's judgment against Bayne & Co. under an action for money had and received. 93 U. S., at 643. In Gaines, the agent of an estate's executors sold estate property and illegally kept a portion of the money. 111 U. S., at 396. Many years later, the agent had died, but Gaines, the legatee of the first estate, brought an action in equity against the administrator of the agent's estate. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment against Gaines because, among other reasons, she had an adequate remedy at law: an action for money had and received. Id., at 397-398.

Bayne and Gaines share two features this case lacks. The first is that, in each, the rightful owner of the money lost it by way of theft. That is, the money passed from the first party to the second party unlawfully. See Bayne, supra, at 643; Gaines, supra, at 396. The second feature is that in both cases the rightful owner of the money sued a third party who had a relationship that, at least for our purposes, made that party legally responsible for the actions of the one who unlawfully took the money. The Court was satisfied in Bayne that the transactions between the paymaster, the banks, and Bayne & Co. were "the result of a fraudulent purpose to secure the use of the public money to Bayne & Co., who received it with full knowledge that it belonged to the United States, and had been applied in manifest violation of the act ofCongress." 93 U. S., at 643. In other words, Bayne & Co. and the paymaster were accomplices, each liable for the acts of the other. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2. In Gaines, petitioner sued the administrator of the agent's estate, who was legally responsible for paying the agent's debts out of the estate. See, e. g., 2 J. Perkins, Williams on Executors and Administrators 988-990 (6th Am. ed. 1877).

The Government does not contend that WBEC stole the money at issue in this case or otherwise took money from the Government unlawfully. WBEC did not. Nor does the Government contend that California and WBEC had a relationship that would make California liable for WBEC's actions. They did not. In fact, California and WBEC had an adverse relationship: that of creditor and debtor. California's demand that WBEC pay what California believed to be a lawful debt does not make California legally responsible for the Government's indemnification of WBEC. In these circumstances, we do not imply a contract in law between California and the Government. Without an implied contract, an action for money had and received will not lie against the State.

Although the Government cannot proceed in an action for money had and received, our discussion of indemnification suggests the Government may not be without recourse: Because it indemnified the contractor, the Government has a right to be subrogated to the contractor's claims against the State. See 10 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1265 (3d ed. 1967); Brief for Respondents 13 (conceding the same). When proceeding by subrogation, the subrogee "stands in the place of one whose claim he has paid." United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 242 (1947). Here WBEC's rights have lapsed and its claims are barred. Under traditional subrogation principles then, the claims of the United States also would be barred. The subrogee, who has all the rights of the subrogor, usually "cannot acquire by subrogation what another whose rights he claims did not have." Ibid. Although WBEC filed actions in state court within 90 days of the Board of Equalization's administrative decisions, WBEC later dismissed those cases without prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice terminates the action and "concludes the rights of the parties in that particular action." Gagnon Co. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 Cal. 2d 448, 455, 289 P. 2d 466, 472 (1955). A subrogee could have proceeded only if WBEC could have filed a new state court action at that time, which it could not do.

The traditional rules of subrogation, however, do not necessarily apply to the Government. But cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947) (suggesting that state law controls "where the Government has simply substituted itself for others as successor to rights governed by state law"). The Government argues strenuously that, at the very least, state statutes of limitations do not bind it. It cites three cases to support this position. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); Board of Jackson County Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939); United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308 (1960). In the cases the Government cites, however, either the right at issue was obtained by the Government through, or created by, a federal statute, see Summerlin, supra, at 416 (United States suing under claim received by assignment pursuant to Act of June 27, 1934, 48 Stat. 1246); Board of Commrs., supra, at 349-350 (United States suing as Indian trustee pursuant to congressional statute); or a federal statute provided the statute of limitations, see John Hancock, supra, at 301 (United States redeeming mortgage foreclosure pursuant to statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c)). Moreover, in each case, the Government was proceeding in its sovereign capacity. As the Government rightly notes,

"When the United States becomes entitled to a claim, acting in its governmental capacity, and asserts its claim in that right, it cannot be deemed to haveabdicated its governmental authority so as to become subject to a state statute putting a time limit upon enforcement." Summerlin, supra, at 417.

In contrast, the Government here became entitled to its claim by indemnifying a private contractor's state law debt. It can assert its claim only by way of subrogation, an equitable action created by the courts. Summerlin is clearly distinguishable.

Whether in general a state law action brought by the United States is subject to a federal or state statute of limitations is a difficult question. We need not resolve it today, however, because Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938), provides guidance in this case. There the United States was proceeding as the assignee of the Soviet Government and sought to collect under state law. The petitioner argued that the statute of limitations had run, and the United States asserted, among other defenses, that it was not bound by state statutes of limitations. We found that the circumstances of the case "admit[ted] of no appeal to such a policy." Id., at 141. Even if the United States had a right to be free from the statute of limitations, it was deprived of no right on those facts. "[F]or the proof demonstrate[d] that the United States never acquired a right free of a pre-existing infirmity, the running of limitations against its assignor, which public policy does not forbid." Id., at 142.

Here, although the Government acquired a right to subrogation to WBEC's claims upon payment of the taxes, the Government did not assert that right until it filed the federal judicial proceeding. As the California Supreme Court has held, " `[A] surety by payment does not become ipso facto subrogated to the rights of the creditor, but only acquires a right to such subrogation, and . . . before the substitution or equitable assignment can actually take place he must actively assert his equitable right thereto. It is not a substantive tangible right of such nature and character that it can be seized and held and enjoyedindependently of a judicial proceeding.' " Offer v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 194 Cal. 114, 117, 228 P. 11, 12 (1924) (quoting 25 Ruling Case Law 1391 (1929)). Accord, 10 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1265, at 848, and n. 9 (citing cases). Because the Government waited until after the state statute of limitations had run against WBEC to bring suit, the Government was not subrogated to "a right free of a pre-existing infirmity." Guaranty Trust, supra, at 142. That the doctrine of subrogation is one of equity only strengthens our conclusion that the Government may not proceed: The Government waitedten years after the first notice of deficiency was issued, eight years after the second notice was issued, and almost six years after the state statute of limitations ran to bring this suit.

The Government argues that affirming the Court of Appeals often will leave it "without an effective remedy to contest a tax improperly exacted from a federal contractor" and subject it to the "vagaries" of 50 state tax law procedures. Brief for United States 26-27. But federal contractors already are subject to the substantive tax laws of the 50 States. Nothing in our decision prevents the Government from including in its contracts a requirement that its contractors be responsible for all taxes the Government believes are wrongfully assessed, a contract term that likely would remove any disinterest a contractor may have toward litigating in state court. If our decision today results in an intolerable drain on the public fisc, Congress, which can take into account the concerns of the States as well as the Federal Government, is free to address the situation. See New Mexico, 455 U. S., at 737-738.

In United States v. New Mexico, we held that the Federal Government is immune only from state taxes imposed on it directly. Id., at 734. In so holding, we hoped to "forestall, at least to a degree, some of themanipulation and wooden formalism that occasionally have marked tax litigation--and that have no proper place in determining the allocation of power between coexisting sovereignties." Id., at 737. Today we hold that shouldering the "entire economic burden of the levy," id., at 734, through indemnification does not give the Federal Government a federal common law cause of action for money had and received to challenge a state tax on state law grounds simply because it is the Government. To do otherwise would be to return to the "manipulation and wooden formalism" we put aside in New Mexico.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.



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